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I. INTRODUCTION
Jurors undoubtedly face difficult, if not seemingly impossible, deci-
sions in the jury room. Deadlocked or hung juries are not uncommon.
In deciding that a jury is hung and that a mistrial should be declared, a
judge must also make a difficult decision. Faced with such a decision, a
judge's reasoning is often based solely on a speculative assessment of the
jury.2 For instance, a judge might have to determine whether a jury is
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1. A 1999 study reviewing statistics from 1980-1997 found federal criminal deadlocked jury
rates were consistently between two and three percent. That study also found the average rate of
deadlocked juries in the state courts of a number of large, urban areas was approximately six percent.
Jason D. Reichelt, Standing Alone: Conformity, Coercion, and the Protection of the Holdout Juror,
40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 569, 582 (2007) (citing William S. Neilson & Harold Winter, The Elimi-
nation of Hung Juries: Retrials and Nonunanimous Verdicts, 25 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 1, 2 (2005));
see also Paula L. Hannaford-Agor & Valerie P. Hans, Nullification at Work? A Glimpse from the
National Center for State Courts Study of Hung Juries, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1249, 1252 (2003)
(noting that some urban areas report deadlock rates in excess of ten percent).
2. See, e.g., United States v. Horn, 583 F.2d 1124, 1125 (10th Cir. 1978). In Horn, the court
held that a judge abused his discretion by declaring a mistrial without first questioning the jury and
when,
[w]ithout ceremony, the judge announced: I am now going to do what I should have done
last evening when I received your note that you were deadlocked. I perhaps should have
at that time declared a mistrial but I thought maybe going home and sleeping upon it, be-
ing a little fresher this morning and may be [sic] you might break the deadlock but you
have been out an hour this morning and have not so I am going to declare a mistrial.
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deadlocked by considering only the fact that the jury deliberated for three
days and sent back a single vague note at the end of the third day.
Armed with only those limited facts, a judge tasked with determining
whether a jury is hung, much like the jury itself, faces a seemingly im-
possible decision.
Judges are not, however, without discretion to use several tools to
4encourage jurors to reach a decision. Although prohibited from ex-
pressly coercing jurors, judges may use techniques such as an Allen
charge5 or a further instruction to encourage jurors to continue delibera-
tions in the hope that, eventually, the jurors may reach a verdict.6 Judges
commonly use these techniques because a judge must ultimately con-
clude that "there is manifest necessity" in declaring a mistrial on account
of a hung jury.7 This high burden is founded on the oft-repeated princi-
ple that a defendant has a "valued right to have his trial completed by a
particular tribunal."8 Justice Joseph Story stated that principle while cau-
tioning that a mistrial "ought to be used with the greatest caution, under
urgent circumstances, and for very plain and obvious causes." 9 Put dif-
ferently, once a jury begins its deliberations, a judge can declare a mis-
trial only with clear proof that the jury is genuinely and hopelessly dead-
locked.10
In practical terms, this high burden means that, even if a jury writes
a note stating that it is deadlocked, a judge cannot declare a mistrial
without considering all of the factors that might have influenced the ju-
Id.
3. See United States v. Razmilovic, 507 F.3d 130, 133-34 (2d Cir. 2007).
4. See, e.g., id at 139 (noting that a judge can instruct the jury to continue deliberating, inquire
whether the jury is deadlocked with respect to all defendants and all counts, give an Allen charge,
and instruct on the possibility of partial verdict) (citations omitted).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Nickell, 883 F.2d 824, 828 (9th Cir. 1989) (describing an Allen
charge as "a supplemental instruction given by the court to encourage a jury to reach a verdict after
that jury has been unable to agree after some period of deliberation" and noting that "[t]he original
form of the instruction was approved by the Supreme Court in Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492,
501 (1896)").
6. Razmilovic, 507 F.3d at 139 (citing United States v. MacQueen, 596 F.2d 76, 79 (2d Cir.
1979)).
7. United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824); see also infra Part Il1.
8. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503 (1978) (quoting Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684,
689 (1949)).
9. Perez, 22 U.S. at 580.
10. United States v. Lansdown, 460 F.2d 164, 169-70 (4th Cir. 1972).
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rors to write that note." To declare a mistrial where a jury was not truly
deadlocked is not a fair outcome for the parties, the attorneys, the judge,
or the jury.' 2 In Justice Story's words, an outcome not founded on mani-
fest necessity defeats "the ends of public justice."'
13
This Comment posits that judges can meet this high burden and de-
finitively determine whether a jury is deadlocked in every case by using
a simple tool: a jury inquiry. In its simplest form, a jury inquiry consists
of a judge asking the jurors, individually or collectively, whether a ver-
dict can be reached in a reasonable amount of time.' 4  In this way, a
judge can elicit concrete and reliable evidence, directly from the jury,
that a mistrial is or is not warranted. 15 A jury inquiry is much like jury
polling, which is required under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
3 1(d) 16 after a verdict if a party requests it, or may be taken at the judge's
discretion.' 7 The Supreme Court or Congress can mandate a similar jury
inquiry rule with an amendment to Rule 31, which should read:
Jury Inquiry. An inquiry into the status of the members of a jury
shall be conducted prior to the declaration of a mistrial and dis-
charge of the jury when such a mistrial is the result of what the
court assumes to be a deadlocked or hung jury. Such an inquiry
shall be directed to each juror individually and shall be done in open
court. In conducting such an inquiry, the court must ask, specifi-
11. See infra Part llI; see also United States v. Horn, 583 F.2d 1124, 1125 (10th Cir. 1978)
(where, despite a note stating they were deadlocked, the judge instructed the jurors "to reach an
agreement if agreement is possible 'without violence to individual judgment').
12. See United States v. See, 505 F.2d 845, 850-51 (9th Cir. 1974).
13. Perez, 22 U.S. at 580.
14. See, e.g., JURY INSTRUCTIONS COMM. OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT, A MANUAL ON JURY TRIAL
PROCEDURES § 5.5C (Aug. 2004 ed.) (explaining that, in the Ninth Circuit, when there is a purported
deadlock, a trial judge should "ask the following question of each member of the panel, 'Do you feel
there is a reasonable probability that the jury can reach a unanimous verdict if sent back to the jury
room for further deliberation?').
15. See generally infra Parts III, IV.
16. This Comment will use the word "Rule" to refer to individual rules in the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
17. This Comment distinguishes between "jury inquiries" and "jury polls" because these terms
refer to two closely related, yet distinct, concepts. Jury inquiries consist of asking each individual
juror whether he or she believes the jury is nearing a verdict or whether he or she believes there is a
reasonable probability that the jury, as a whole, can reach a verdict in a reasonable amount of time.
See, e.g., United States v. Horn, 583 F.2d 1124, 1129 (10th Cir. 1978). Polling a jury, on the other
hand, consists of receiving an actual tally of "not guilty" and "guilty" votes from jurors. FED. R.
CRIM. P. 31(d). Due to the somewhat interchangeability of these terms, some of the quotations from
court decisions and/or court memoranda do not distinguish between these two concepts. To the
extent this occurs, this Comment attempts to make the distinction apparent by modifying quotations
when necessary. The differences between these methods will be discussed more fully in Part IV.B.
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cally, whether each member of the jury believes that there is a rea-
sonable probability that the jury can, in a reasonable amount of
time, reach a verdict as to each count and as to each defendant of
the case at bar if sent back to the jury room for further deliberation.
The court may conduct such a jury inquiry on its own or at the re-
quest of a party if there is any indication, explicit or implicit, that
the jury is deadlocked or hung.
Like Rule 3 1(d), a jury inquiry rule should be discretionary and im-
plemented either at the request of a party or at the court's discretion.
Unlike Rule 31(d), however, there are certain circumstances in which a
jury inquiry rule should be mandatory, namely, whenever a judge seeks
to declare a mistrial due to a hung or deadlocked jury.
In such instances, a mandatory jury inquiry rule is advantageous for
a number of reasons. First, an inquiry would give the judge quantitative
evidence from which to determine whether further deliberations might
overcome a deadlock. 8 Accordingly, the judge would have a basis for
his decision to either require the jury to continue deliberating or to de-
clare a mistrial and discharge the jury.19 Second, the direct statement
from the jury would provide evidence to determine whether a mistrial
was declared hastily and without "manifest necessity. ' 20 For example, if
a mistrial was appealed, less would be required of an appeals court be-
cause, with a direct statement that the jury was deadlocked, there would
be little basis upon which to argue that the judge abused his discretion.2 1
Finally, an inquiry into each defendant and each count could uncover
whether the jury has made a unanimous decision as to certain counts and
whether the jury has deadlocked as to others.22 Because most jurors do
18. See, e.g., Horn, 583 F.2d at 1127; Arnold v. McCarthy, 566 F.2d 1377, 1387 (9th Cir.
1978); United States v. See, 505 F.2d 845, 851 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Goldstein, 479 F.2d
1061, 1069 (2d Cir. 1973).
19. See, e.g., Horn, 583 F.2d at 1127; Arnold, 566 F.2d at 1387; See, 505 F.2d at 851; Gold-
stein, 479 F.2d at 1069.
20. See Horn, 583 F.2d at 1129 (noting that "manifest" means something that is "evident,
visible, and plain") (citation omitted).
21. See United States v. Razmilovic, 507 F.3d 130, 137 (2d Cir. 2007) (noting that the abuse of
discretion standard requires a finding that the judge exercised "sound discretion") (citing Arizona v.
Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 514 (1978)); see also Brief for Defendant-Appellant Michael DeGennaro
at 27 n.7, United States v. Razmilovic, 507 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2007) (No. 06-4195-cr-L), 2006 WL
5428289 [hereinafter DeGennaro Br.] (citing Horn, 583 F.2d at 1127-28; Arnold, 566 F.2d at 1387).
22. DeGennaro Br., supra note 21, at 27 n.7 ("This case well illustrates the wisdom of such a
[mandatory jury inquiry] rule, because further inquiry of the jury would very likely have revealed
that the jury was willing and able ... to deliver complete verdicts as to two of the three defendants..
. .,").
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not have legal training, unless advised of Rule 31(b),23 jurors are most
likely unaware of their option to declare a partial verdict.24 Where an
inquiry reveals that certain counts were decided unanimously, those deci-
sions may be recorded and accepted as partial verdicts.25 Thus, a jury
inquiry will lighten judicial dockets by eliminating counts and entire de-
fendants from subsequent proceedings.26
This Comment considers the concept of a jury inquiry and con-
cludes that, with a mandatory jury inquiry rule, judges will ensure that
the public ends of justice are met before a mistrial is declared. Part II of
this Comment examines the United States v. Razmilovic trial to give a
concrete example of how a jury inquiry would have prevented a hastily
declared mistrial. Part III.A examines the circuit trend regarding the
definition of "manifest necessity." Toward the end of the 1970s, many
circuits began to opine that jury inquiries were important when attempt-
ing to determine whether there was manifest necessity, especially where
juries were apparently deadlocked. Part III.B demonstrates how the
trend has solidified, in some circuits, into a mandatory rule that requires
a judge to inquire into the status of the jury prior to declaring a mistrial.
Part III.C also considers cases from circuits that have rejected the manda-
tory rule and examines the rationale behind such decisions.
Part IV looks into the practicality of jury inquiries. Part IV.A asks
whether a mandatory jury inquiry rule should be limited to only multiple
defendant cases. Part IV.B considers the form that the rule should take:
whether the inquiry should be performed individually or collectively and
whether in open court or out of court. Part IV.C sets forth the instruction
that a trial judge should use in conducting the inquiry. And Part IV.D
once more sets forth the language of the rule as it should be written in the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Part V concludes by revisiting the
Razmilovic case and reconsidering the trial as if a mandatory jury inquiry
rule had been in effect. By reflecting on this concrete example, this
23. FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(b): (1) "If there are multiple defendants, the jury may return a verdict
at any time during its deliberations as to any defendant about whom it has agreed"; (2) "If the jury
cannot agree on all counts as to any defendant, the jury may return a verdict on those counts on
which it has agreed"; (3) "If the jury cannot agree on a verdict on one or more counts, the court may
declare a mistrial on those counts. The government may retry any defendant on any count on which
the jury could not agree."
24. Statistics on this point are unavailable; however, an example of a case in which the jurors
were unaware of their right to a partial verdict can be found in Razmilovic, 507 F.3d at 139.
25. FED R. CRIM. P. 31 (b).
26. See, e.g., Razmilovic, 507 F.3d at 142 (holding that retrial of Mr. DeGennaro and Mr.
Borghese was barred under the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause).
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Comment demonstrates that a mandatory jury inquiry rule not only pro-
motes judicial efficiency, but also provides reliable evidence that will
prevent mistrials.
1I. THE PRACTICAL EFFECTS OF THE JURY INQUIRY RULE IN THE
CONTEXT OF THE RAZMLOVIC TRIAL
To demonstrate how a mandatory jury inquiry rule could affect a
trial, imagine yourself as a juror in the following scenario. You sit
alongside eleven other jurors for nearly two months. Over forty wit-
nesses testify about three defendants and their purported involvement in
a twenty-five count indictment. Each defendant was an executive in a
complex public company, specializing in a business practice that you
knew nothing about prior to the trial. Imagine the difficulty, day in and
day out, of not discussing the case with the jurors sitting beside you.
Now imagine that, after nearly two months of silence and small
talk, you are suddenly ordered to deliberate. You can rely only on your
recollection and possibly some notes you took during the six weeks of
testimony, plus various exhibits of financial and accounting data, and a
twenty-five count indictment. You have no legal training or background.
You know only that you must reach a unanimous verdict. And you know
that you have a limited ability to converse with the judge and cannot,
under any circumstance, reveal what has transpired in your deliberations.
Finally, imagine that after fewer than four days of deliberation, you
and your fellow jurors have decided twenty-four of the twenty-five
counts unanimously, but cannot reach consensus on the last count.
Looking for guidance, you and your fellow jurors decide to send the
judge a note. It is the end of the day. You and your fellow jurors are
tired and ready to retire for the evening. The foreperson's note states,
quite simply, that the jury is "deadlocked" and would like to go home
today. Shortly thereafter, the judge releases the jury for the day, instruct-
ing the jury to return to court the following morning.
You spend your commute home and the dinner hour wondering
how you will decide the last count. Your thoughts are interrupted, how-
ever, by a call from the judge's chambers. The judge declared a mistrial.
You are not to come back the next day. Your deliberations are over.
The case no longer rests in your hands. Your time and efforts are for
naught. Even though you had unanimously agreed on twenty-four
counts, you and your fellow jurors will never be able to announce your
verdict. How would you feel? Would you feel as if you had fulfilled
your duty as a juror? Will the unanimous decisions you and your fellow
jurors reached be ignored?
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Later you discover that you had the option to declare a partial ver-
dict.27 Thus, you and your fellows jurors could have rendered a "not
guilty" verdict for the two defendants you had unanimously decided were
not guilty. And you could have rendered a "not guilty" verdict as to the
other defendant on all but one count. Is it fair that you had this option
but were unaware of it during your deliberations?
This scenario is United States v. Razmilovic. 28 The jurors sat for
over six weeks, beginning two days after the first of the year and ending
on February 15, 2006.29 Over forty witnesses testified about a purported
scheme involving a number of employees at Symbol Technologies, Inc.,
the world's largest manufacturer of bar-code scanners and related tech-
nologies.30 Three former Symbol executives were defendants: Kenneth
Jaeggi, the former chief financial officer, Michael DeGennaro, the for-
mer senior vice-president of finance, and Frank Borghese, the former
senior vice-president of sales.31 In a highly complex case, the defendants
were charged in a twenty-five count indictment, ranging from manipula-
tion of the company's financial records, to conspiracy to defraud the In-
ternal Revenue Service, to stock option back-dating.32 The indictment
spanned three years of company history and implicated a number of so-
phisticated accounting, tax, and securities concepts.33
The jury began its deliberations on February 15th, after receiving
instructions from the judge that included the following: (1) the jury must
consider each count and each defendant separately; (2) the jury must
reach any verdict unanimously; and (3) the jury must communicate with
the court only in writing and by way of a note.34 The judge further ad-
monished the jury that the notes it sent should not disclose where the jury
stood on the issue of guilt or innocence.
35
Despite otherwise detailed instructions, the jury received no in-
struction regarding partial verdicts under Rule 31(b).36 Rule 3 1 (b) gives
flexibility to juries deciding complex cases like Razmilovic. The rule
provides that decisions as to each count must be unanimous, but deci-
27. FED. R. CRIM. P. 3 1(b)(1).
28. No. 04-CR-519 (E.D.N.Y.) (Wexler, J., presiding), rev'd, 507 F.3d 130 (2d. Cir. 2007).
29. DeGennaro Br., supra note 21, at 4, 8.
30. Id. at 2, 4.
31.Id. at 2-3.
32. Id. at 2-4.
33.Id. at3.
34. Id. at 8-9.
35. Id. at 9.
36.1d.
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sions as to each defendant need not be unanimous.37 Thus, the rule al-
lows the jury to return a partial verdict as to certain counts and against
certain defendants. 38 And, in some instances, a partial verdict also al-
lows the jury to return a guilty or not guilty verdict for a defendant for
whom all counts were decided unanimously. 39 The Razmilovic jury
would have greatly benefited had it been instructed of Rule 3 1(b).
The jury returned to its deliberations on Tuesday, February 2 1, fol-
lowing the three-day President's Day weekend.4 ° In the early afternoon,
the jury sent a note asking the judge if "each count require[d] a unani-
mous decision. " 4A To this, the judge simply responded "yes," and gave
no further explanation.42
The jury sent another note to the court at the end of the day, which
the judge read aloud to the parties:43 "Judge, we are at a dead lock [sic].
We have exhausted all our options. This has been going on since Thurs-
day. P/S - We are ready to go home today. Thank you. '"4
Despite stating that the jury was deadlocked, the note did not elabo-
rate on whether there was a deadlock on only certain counts, to only cer-
tain defendants, or to all counts and all defendants. 45 The jurors adhered
to the judge's instruction and revealed no specifics regarding their delib-
erations.46 The "deadlock" statement was even more ambiguous given
the note submitted earlier in the day regarding the unanimity require-
ment.47 Considered alongside the earlier note, the jurors likely believed
they were deadlocked because they were unaware of their option to de-
clare a partial verdict and because they had not reached a unanimous
decision on all counts. 48 In fact, it would be discovered later that the ju-
rors reached unanimous decisions as to all but a single count against a
single defendant.49
Furthermore, at first glance the comment that the jurors were "ready
to go home today" could convey to a reasonable person that they were
37. FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(b).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. DeGennaro Br., supra note 21, at 10.
41.Id. at 11.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See id
47.Id. at 15-16.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 18 n.5.
[Vol. 32:971
2009] Dodging Mistrials with a Mandatory Jury Inquiry Rule 979
ready to stop deliberating altogether.5" However, the note was sent at the
end of the day; thus, the comment could also convey merely what it
said-they were done for the day.5  The Razmilovic jurors later con-
firmed that the latter was in fact the case: they were prepared to return
the next day, but were eager for the court's guidance as to how to pro-
ceed.52
Regardless of how the note would later be scrutinized and inter-
preted, Judge Wexler read the note aloud and advised the parties that he
would excuse the jurors for the day with instructions to return the follow-
ing morning. 3 After the jurors left the courtroom, the judge stated that
the trial would continue the next morning unless someone wanted him to
declare a mistrial.54 Judge Wexler gave no reason why a mistrial might
be justified. 5 Yet, Mr. Jaeggi's counsel took Judge Wexler's recom-
mendation and moved for a mistrial without articulating a basis for why a
mistrial was warranted other than the ambiguous note. 56  Mr. DeGen-
naro's counsel instantly objected to a mistrial; instead, he asked the judge
to poll the jurors to determine whether they had reached a partial ver-
dict.57  The Government also objected.58  Despite these objections, the
judge hastily declared a mistrial.59
Judge Wexler also rejected counsel's requests to poll the jurors. 60
He announced that "to save money," a member of his staff would call the
jurors that night to inform them that their jury service was concluded and
that they need not return to court.6 1 Judge Wexler entertained little ar-
50. See id. at 11.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 18 n.5.
53. Id. at 12.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 12-13. Mr. Borghese's counsel initially moved for a mistrial but then reversed him-
self and joined in the request that inquiry be made of the jury as to whether it had reached a verdict
as to any defendant on any count. Id. at 13. The court transcript, however, did not reflect that Mr.
Borghese's counsel eventually joined in the inquiry request. Id. at 13 n.4. Nevertheless, on appeal,
the Second Circuit reasoned that, although Mr. Borghese initially joined in Mr. Jaeggi's motion,
"within seconds of the trial court declaring a mistrial [counsel for Mr.] Borghese stated that he
joined in DeGennaro's request that the jury be polled before any decision on the mistrial was final-
ized." United States v. Razmilovic, 507 F.3d 130, 141 (2d Cir. 2007). As a result, the Second
Circuit held that Mr. Borghese "cannot be said to have deliberately foregone his right to have his
guilt determined by his original tribunal." Id. at 142.
58. DeGennaro Br., supra note 21, at 13.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 13-14, 17.
61. Id. at 14-15.
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gument regarding the mistrial and eventually sent the parties home, con-
cluding, "Counsel, it is over.
'62
As Judge Wexler directed, the jury was discharged that evening via
phone calls from his bailiff.63 Defense counsel later learned from several
of the jurors that the "deadlock" comment on the note was in reference to
only one of the twenty-five counts in the indictment: a conspiracy charge
against Mr. Jaeggi. 64 In short, other than a single count against Mr.
Jaeggi, the jurors were prepared to find that all three defendants were not
guilty of all charges.65
Despite this information, Judge Wexler declined another request by
defense counsel to allow the jury to return a partial verdict. 66 Mr. De-
Gennaro and Mr. Borghese then moved to dismiss the indictment on
April 28, 2006, arguing that retrial was barred by the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.67 On August 31, 2006, Judge Wexler
denied the motions to dismiss.68 Mr. DeGennaro and Mr. Borghese then
appealed to the Second Circuit, arguing that Judge Wexler had abused
his discretion by declaring a mistrial without clear evidence that the jury
was genuinely deadlocked.69
The Second Circuit found in favor of Mr. DeGennaro and Mr.
Borghese. 70 The court held that Judge Wexler abused his discretion by
hastily declaring a mistrial without an adequate showing of manifest ne-
cessity. 7 1 Therefore, the Double Jeopardy Clause 72 barred retrying Mr.
DeGennaro and Mr. Borghese.73 To determine whether the jury was
genuinely deadlocked, the court considered the following factors: (1)
whether there were statements by the jury that it could not agree; (2)
62. Id. at 16.
63. Id. at 14-15.
64. Id. at 18 n.5.
65. Brief and Special Appendix for Defendant-Appellant Frank Borghese at 10, United States
v. Razmilovic, 507 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2007) (No. 06-4195-cr(L)), 2006 WL 5428290 [hereinafter
Borghese Br.].
66. DeGennaro Br., supra note 21, at 19-20.
67. Id. at 20. Mr. Jaeggi did not appeal the decision because his counsel had moved for the
mistrial; therefore, he could not assert that retrial was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. Raz-
milovic, 507 F.3d at 140-41 ("When a defendant moves for or consents to a mistrial, the Double
Jeopardy Clause usually imposes no bar to retrying that defendant." (citing United States v. Huang,
960 F.2d 1128, 1133 (2d Cir. 1992))).
68. DeGennaro Br., supra note 21, at 20.
69. Id. at 20-21; Borghese Br., supra note 65, at 19-20.
70. Razmilovic, 507 F.3d at 142.
71. Id.
72. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
73. Razmilovic, 507 F.3d at 142.
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whether the length and complexity of the trial correlated to the amount of
time that the jury had deliberated; and (3) whether Judge Wexler took
any actions to determine whether the jury was genuinely deadlocked.74
Part III takes up the first and third factors of this test, explaining
how appellate courts interpret these factors when reviewing mistrial de-
cisions. Part IV then demonstrates how a mandatory jury inquiry rule
will provide uncontroverted evidence to determine whether these factors
are met and whether, in any given case, a jury is genuinely deadlocked.
III. THE CIRCUIT COURTS' TREND IN DEFINING MANIFEST NECESSITY
When reviewing whether a trial judge abused his discretion by de-
claring a mistrial due to a hung jury, an appellate court must consider the
totality of the circumstances and assess whether there was "a reasonable
possibility that an impartial verdict [could have been] reached., 75 Practi-
cally speaking, an appellate court must ask whether the jury was "hope-
lessly deadlocked? '76 Appellate courts afford trial courts substantial def-
erence because, regardless of the parties' conduct, ultimately "the trial
judge must ... take care to assure himself that the situation warrants ac-
tion on his part., 77 Therefore, an appellate court will reverse only if the
decision to declare a mistrial was not manifestly necessary.78
Part III.A first takes up this vague manifest necessity concept,
which the "Supreme Court has explicitly and repeatedly refused to make
... any more precise.,, 79 As a result, this Part explains that circuit courts
have developed different standards upon which to view a trial judge's
actions during jury deliberations. Part III.A concludes by showing that
every circuit generally agrees that the length of deliberations, "without
more," is not enough to prove that a jury is genuinely deadlocked, yet the
circuits do not agree what constitutes that something more.8°
Part III.B sets forth the Ninth and Tenth Circuit interpretations of
the "something more" concept. In those circuits, trial judges must re-
ceive a statement directly from the jury that it cannot agree.81 Practically
74. Id. at 137-38.
75. United States v. Gordy, 526 F.2d 631, 636 (5th Cir. 1976).
76. See id.
77. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 486 (1971) (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
78. Id.; see also United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824).
79. Arnold v. McCarthy, 566 F.2d 1377, 1386 (9th Cir. 1978) (citing Illinois v. Somerville, 410
U.S. 458, 462 (1973); Jorn, 400 U.S. at 485-86; Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364, 368 (1960);
Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 691 (1949)).
80. See, e.g., United States v. Lansdown, 460 F.2d 164, 169 (4th Cir. 1972).
81. See United States v. See, 505 F.2d 845, 851 (9th Cir. 1974).
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speaking, the Ninth and Tenth Circuits require trial judges to individually
question jurors prior to declaring a mistrial and, therefore, adhere to the
rule that this Comment advocates for: a mandatory jury inquiry rule.82
Yet, Part III.B concludes by noting that the rule adopted in the Ninth and
Tenth Circuits is unlimited in scope and, in many ways, overly broad.
Finally, Part III.C addresses the circuits which have not adopted a
mandatory rule like the Ninth and Tenth Circuits. In fact, some courts
have expressly declined to adopt the Ninth and Tenth Circuits' manda-
tory jury inquiry rule.83 The courts that have rejected the rule provide no
substantive justification for doing so; rather, those courts reason merely
that the trial judge's sound discretion must be afforded deference 84 or
that "every case [must] turn[] on its own facts., 85 However, as Part III.C
explains, these declining courts have failed to recognize that the jury in-
quiry rule would not disregard these standards: the trial judge will still be
afforded deference86 and the facts will still be considered.87 These de-
clining circuits also fail to recognize that, given the uniquely difficult
decision trial judges confront with a potentially hung jury, such decisions
should not be based on judicial instinct alone.88  A mandatory jury in-
quiry rule ensures that instinct is not the sole rationale. Rather, such a
rule requires trial judges to determine whether a jury is hung by using
quantitative and reliable evidence from the very body they must ulti-
mately assess: the jurors themselves. 89
82. Arnold, 566 F.2d at 1387 (citing See, 505 F.2d at 851); United States v. Horn, 583 F.2d
1124, 1127-29 (10th Cir. 1978).
83. United States v. Razmilovic, 507 F.3d 130, 140 n.3 (2d Cir. 2007); United States v. Mac-
Queen, 596 F.2d 76, 82 (2d Cir. 1979); see also State v. Graham, 83 P.3d 143, 151-52 (Kan. 2004)
(declining to adopt a mandatory jury inquiry rule).
84. Infra Part II1.C (discussing Razmilovic, 507 F.3d at 140 n.3); see also Graham, 83 P.3d at
150-51.
85. Infra Part III.C (discussing MacQueen, 596 F.2d at 82).
86. See Arnold, 566 F.2d at 1387 (citing See, 505 F.2d at 852 n.12; United States v. Goldstein,
479 F.2d 1061, 1069 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Lansdown, 460 F.2d 164, 169 (4th Cir. 1972)).
87. See Horn, 583 F.2d at 1128-29 (reviewing the record and holding that there was "virtually
a complete lack of evidence of deadlock").
88. See Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 509-10 (1978).
89. See Horn, 583 F.2d at 1128 (holding that mistrial was not manifestly necessary because the
judge did not make an inquiry of the jury and so there was "virtually a complete lack of evidence of
deadlock as of the time that the mistrial was granted ... [and] a dearth of evidence as to the jury's
inability thereafter to reach a verdict"); see also Arnold, 566 F.2d at 1387; See, 505 F.2d at 851.
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A. Early Decisions: Setting Forth that "Something Additional"
Must be Established to Prove "Manifest Necessity," but Declin-
ing to Articulate What "Something Additional" Entails
Beginning in the 1970s, the circuits of the United States Court of
Appeals began to closely examine Justice Story's manifest necessity
standard and question whether there was, in fact, a way to quantify those
"circumstances" that Justice Story found "impossible to define." 90 Un-
doubtedly, the courts could not foresee every circumstance; nevertheless,
a checklist of factors would be a useful guide for future appellate courts
to review mistrials declared on account of genuinely deadlocked juries.
91
A checklist first emerged in the 1970s and then grew through the insights
of numerous circuit courts. Yet, by the end of the decade, judicial inter-
est in the manifest necessity standard had waned. As a result, only a
handful of 1970s decisions represent the universe of circuit court inter-
pretations of manifest necessity.
Tracking the development of these cases provides insight into the
circuits' reasoning and also details a full checklist of factors that courts
currently use when determining manifest necessity. With each decision,
a trend toward stricter judicial responsibility and individual questioning
of jurors becomes more apparent.92 As a result, appellate courts more
often overturn a trial judge's mistrial decision when the trial judge failed
to question each juror concerning the probability of reaching a verdict.
93
Even so, while the circuits agreed that the crucial issue was the subjec-
tive belief of the jury,94 the circuits also continued to emphasize the trial
judge's role as ultimate decision-maker. 95 The result is appellate courts
that are willing to defer to a trial judge's "sound discretion" in those
cases that do not fit neatly into the factors laid out in precedent. As Parts
III.B and III.C explain more fully, such deference is a primary reason
courts have not deemed it necessary to adopt a mandatory jury inquiry
rule.
First, in United States v. Lansdown, the Fourth Circuit emphasized
that, to assess "whether there is a possibility that the jury can reach a
90. United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824).
91. See Arnold, 566 F.2d at 1386-87.
92. Compare United States v. Lansdown, 460 F.2d 164, 169 (4th Cir. 1972) ("something addi-
tional" factor), with United States v. Gordy, 526 F.2d 631, 636-37 (5th Cir. 1976) (requiring trial
courts to ask jurors "individually").
93. See supra Part III.A-B.
94. See, e.g., United States v. See, 505 F.2d 845, 851 (9th Cir. 1974) (citing Lansdown, 460
F.2d at 170).
95. See, e.g., See, 505 F.2d at 850 (citing Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 462 (1973)).
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verdict within reasonable time" the "most reliable source ... is the jury
itself."96 Although the judge had ultimate discretion, the court stressed
that jurors themselves were the best indicators as to whether they were
deadlocked.97 The Fourth Circuit further articulated a starting point from
which future courts would consider the manifest necessity standard: "The
conclusion that a jury is unable to reach a verdict must be supported by
something in addition to the trial court's conclusion that the jury has de-
liberated long enough. 98 The length of deliberations thus became the
first factor and the outer boundary for the courts' conception of manifest
necessity. However, a judge must have considered more than merely the
length of the deliberations to establish that the jury was genuinely hung
and that a mistrial was manifestly necessary. 99 Unfortunately, the court
did not set forth any other factors that, in addition to lengthy delibera-
tions, would constitute manifest necessity.' 00 Nevertheless, the decision
encouraged other circuits to question what factors might add up to that
"something additional.''
The following year in United States ex rel. Russo v. Superior Court,
the Third Circuit further articulated the Fourth Circuit's "something ad-
ditional" concept. 1 2 In Russo, the court barred retrial because, despite
the likelihood that the jury was exhausted after deliberating for fifteen
hours, the length of the deliberations was insufficient to establish that the
jury was deadlocked. 0 3 Instead, the court noted that the trial judge had
not taken adequate measures to establish that the jury was exhausted. 04
Specifically, "not only was there no inquiry as to the physical condition
of the jurors, there was no questioning them as to their progress towards
reaching a verdict., 10 5 Having not gathered any information directly
from the jurors, the Third Circuit held that the trial judge failed to use
sound discretion and that the mistrial was hasty, improper, and not mani-
festly necessary.
106
96. Lansdown, 460 F.2d at 169.
97. Id.
98. Id. (emphasis added).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See id.
102. United States ex rel. Russo v. Superior Court, 483 F.2d 7 (3d Cir. 1973).
103. Id at 16.
104. Id. at 15-16.
105. Id. at 16.
106. Id. at 16-17.
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In United States v. See, decided the next year, the Ninth Circuit
weighed in on the discussion of manifest necessity. 10 7 The court referred
to Lansdown and set forth a number of "significant factors" relevant to
determining whether a judge had abused his discretion.' ° 8 Of these fac-
tors, the "'crucial factor' in determining the probability of agreement is a
statement from the jury that it is 'hopelessly deadlocked."" 10 9 The court
further explained that the burden is on the trial judge to "question the
jury ... on the possibility that its current deadlock could be overcome by
further deliberations. ' 1 ° The court did not opine on the form the inquiry
should take; but rather, the court noted that jury polling was the "pre-
ferred method in some states,""' while questioning the jury as a group
on the "possibility of a verdict" was an acceptable alternative."12
The Ninth Circuit did not go so far as to say that an inquiry or poll-
ing would be required in every criminal case. Instead, the decision to
conduct a jury inquiry fell solely on the trial judge, who was instructed to
take adequate steps to gather the most reliable evidence from which to
make his decision."i 3 Prior to declaring a jury deadlock, the trial judge
should consider the following factors: (1) "the exhaustion of the jury";
(2) "the length of the trial and the complexity of the issues"; and (3) "the
time taken in deliberations." ' 1 4 These three factors set the stage for even
further specification of the manifest necessity standard and affirmed that
the ultimate decision-making and fact-finding responsibility rested on the
trial judge. 15
Only a few months after the Ninth Circuit decided See, the Third
Circuit further emphasized the trial judge's responsibilities. 16 In United
States ex rel. Webb v. Court of Common Pleas, the court began its opin-
ion by noting the very "narrow limits" under which a trial court could
declare a mistrial: "a trial court must exercise extreme caution before
declaring a mistrial." '' 1 7 In Webb, despite questioning the jury foreman,
107. United States v. See, 505 F.2d 845 (9th Cir. 1974).
108. Id. at 851.
109. Id. (citing United States v. Lansdown, 460 F.2d 164, 170 (4th Cir. 1972)).
110. Id. (citing United States v. Goldstein, 479 F.2d 1061, 1068-69 (2d Cir. 1973);
STANDARDS RELATING TO TRIAL BY JURY § 5.4(c) (Approved Draft 1968)).
111. Id. (citing Paulson v. Superior Court, 372 P.2d 641 (Cal. 1962)).
112. Id. (citing Clemensen v. Municipal Court, 96 Cal. Rptr. 126, 131-32 (Ct. App. 1971);
People v. Caradine, 44 Cal. Rptr. 875, 878 (Ct. App. 1965)).
113. Id. at 851-52.
114. Id. at 852 (emphasis added).
115. See id.
116. United States ex reL Webb v. Court of Common Pleas, 516 F.2d 1034 (3d Cir. 1975).
117. Id. at 1042 (emphasis added).
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the court held that the trial judge abused his discretion by declaring a
mistrial because "there [was] no clear showing that the foreman's re-
sponses here necessarily represented the unanimous opinion of the
jury .... ""8 Thus, the Webb court added an additional unanimity re-
quirement that was satisfied only if the jury was questioned individually,
not simply through a single representative. 19
In so holding, the court placed further emphasis on a clear and un-
ambiguous response from the jurors themselves.1 20 The judge could not
rely simply on instinct. 121 As Lansdown first established, there must be
something in addition to the judge's instinct. 122 The Webb court defined
that something additional as not just words directly from the jury fore-
man, but as words directly from each juror.123 To obtain such a state-
ment necessarily requires a jury inquiry. 124
One year later, in United States v. Gordy, the Fifth Circuit extended
Webb's unanimity requirement and also added requirements concerning
the information sought to be obtained from the jury inquiry.1 25 The court
held that the trial court erred in declaring a mistrial, first noting that "[n]o
dialogue was developed with panel members individually. 1 26 Instead,
the trial judge spoke only with the foreman, which alone, the court held,
insufficiently demonstrated genuine deadlock.1 27  Second, even if the
foreman had correctly interpreted the feelings of the other jurors, his "re-
port alone cannot answer the more important question of whether [the
jury's] present inability to agree should have been characterized as per-
manent."128 Thus, the purpose of a jury inquiry was not to determine
whether the jurors were currently deadlocked; rather, the purpose of a
jury inquiry was to determine whether the jurors believed they could
reach a decision in a reasonable amount of time.1 29 Finally, the court
118. Id. at 1044.
119. Id.
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. United States v. Lansdown, 460 F.2d 164, 168-69 (4th Cir. 1972) (noting that judicial
discretion was becoming even narrower).
123. See Webb, 516 F.2d at 1044.
124. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 31 advisory comm. notes (1998) ("The Committee is persuaded by
the authorities and practice that there are advantages of conducting an individual poll of the jurors.
Thus, the rule requires that the jurors be polled individually when a polling is requested, or when
polling is directed sua sponte by the court.").
125. United States v. Gordy, 526 F.2d 631, 636-37 (5th Cir. 1976).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 636.
128. Id. (emphasis added).
129. See id
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held that the trial judge's "communications with the jurors prior to dis-
charge were too inconclusive to demonstrate the existence of a 'manifest
necessity' to terminate the trial.' 30  Hence, the information obtained
from the jurors must be conclusive: there should be no "doubts" and
there should be "a record clearly demonstrating that the panel members
felt no verdict could be reached if they were given more time."',
31
In total, the Fifth Circuit announced new standards that required a
judicial inquiry into the subjective beliefs of each individual juror as to
the capability of reaching a verdict in a reasonable amount of time.
132
This requirement further established that the jurors must be questioned
individually. 133 And like the decisions from courts of appeals before it,
the Gordy court emphasized the trial judge's role in determining genuine
deadlock.
134
Beginning in 1972, each year that passed brought with it a new cir-
cuit decision more specifically defining Justice Story's manifest neces-
sity standard. 35 The circuits agreed that two issues were of central im-
portance: the subjective belief of the jury,' 36 balanced with the judge's
role as the ultimate decision-maker. 37 As the 1970s neared an end, how-
ever, the Ninth and Tenth Circuits tipped the balance in favor of the jury
by mandating inquiries before a judge could declare a mistrial.
B. The Ninth and Tenth Circuits Set Forth the Jury Inquiry Rule in
Arnold v. McCarthy and United States v. Horn
In 1978, the Ninth and Tenth Circuits adopted rules that required
trial judges to question jurors individually prior to declaring a mistrial.
138
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. The Gordy court noted that in United States v. Amaya, 509 F.2d 8 (5th Cir. 1975), the
Fifth Circuit had held that merely asking the jury where it was "numerically divi[ded]" was error per
se. Gordy, 526 F.2d at 636 n.2. The Gordy court stated that this rule was "designed to prevent co-
erced verdicts" that result when jurors feel unduly influenced to come to a conclusion given the
pressure of the questioning. Id. As is discussed in Part IV.B, however, the way in which the jury
inquiry is conducted can lessen the coercion with which the Amaya court was undoubtedly con-
cerned.
133. Gordy, 526 F.2d at 636-37; United States ex rel. Webb v. Court of Common Pleas, 516
F.2d 1034, 1044 (3d Cir. 1975).
134. See Gordy, 526 F.2d at 636.
135. United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824).
136. United States v. See, 505 F.2d 845, 851 (9th Cir. 1974) (citing United States v. Lansdown,
460 F.2d 164, 170 (4th Cir. 1972)).
137. See, 505 F.2d at 850 (citing Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 462 (1973)).
138. United States v. Horn, 583 F.2d 1124, 1127-29 (10th Cir. 1978); Arnold v. McCarthy,
566 F.2d 1377, 1387 (9th Cir. 1978).
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In two cases decided in 1978, these circuits suggested that jury inquiries
were mandatory whenever the jury appeared to be deadlocked and the
judge was considering a mistrial. 39
The Ninth Circuit first set forth a mandatory jury inquiry require-
ment in Arnold v. McCarthy.140  In that case, the court cited cases that
had set forth a number of factors 14 necessary to assess whether a jury
was hopelessly deadlocked.1 42  Citing See, the court asserted that the
most critical factor was the jury's own statement. 43 Then, the court went
a step further to announce the following rule: "Upon receiving a commu-
nication from the jury stating that it cannot agree, the trial court must
question the jury to determine independently whether further delibera-
tions might overcome the deadlock."' 44
Though the court held that the trial judge did not abuse his discre-
tion in the case at bar, 145 the precedential value of the decision lay in the
court's assertion of a new rule imposing a mandatory requirement on
trial judges. 146  As demonstrated in Part III.A, the rule was not com-
pletely novel because courts had hinted at it throughout the 1970s. Nev-
ertheless, the Arnold decision represented a significant step: the rule was
finally stated definitively in a circuit court holding.
Yet, the Arnold court did not limit the rule to a finite set of cases or
circumstances. 147  Consequently, in the Ninth Circuit, a jury inquiry is
139. See Horn, 583 F.2d at 1127-29; Arnold, 566 F.2d at 1387.
140. Arnold, 566 F.2d at 1387.
141. Supra Part III.A.
142. Arnold, 566 F.2d at 1387-88. The Arnold court listed the following factors as those
courts have isolated as
useful in determining whether a judge has properly exercised his discretion to declare a
deadlocked jury: (1) a timely objection by defendant, (2) the jury's collective opinion that
it cannot agree, (3) the length of the deliberations of the jury, (4) the length of the trial,
(5) the complexity of the issues presented to the jury, (6) any proper communications
which the judge has had with the jury, and (7) the effects of possible exhaustion and the
impact which coercion of further deliberations might have on the verdict.
Id. at 1386-87 (citing United States v. Gordy, 526 F.2d 631, 635-36 (5th Cir. 1976); United States
ex rel. Webb v. Court of Common Pleas, 516 F.2d 1031 (majority and dissenting opinions); United
States v. See, 505 F.2d 845, 851-52 (9th Cir. 1974); United States ex rel. Russo v. Superior Court,
483 F.2d 7, 16 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v. Goldstein, 479 F.2d 1061, 1068 (2d Cir. 1973);
United States v. Lansdown, 460 F.2d 164, 170 (4th Cir. 1972)).
143. Arnold, 566 F.2d at 1386-87 (citing See, 505 F.2d at 85 1).
144. Arnold, 566 F.2d at 1386-87.
145. Id. at 1387-88.
146. Compare Lansdown, 460 F.2d at 169 (ambiguous "something additional" factor), with
Arnold, 566 F.2d at 1387 (prior to mistrial, "court must question the jury") (emphasis added).
147. The Arnold court stated simply that an inquiry must be conducted whenever a judge re-
ceived "a communication from the jury stating that it cannot agree." Arnold, 566 F.2d at 1387. The
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required in every case in which the jury is potentially deadlocked.
148
Had the Arnold court reconsidered its statement, it might have qualified
the rule to limit its scope. The court, however, never had the opportunity
to reconsider the case in a subsequent proceeding,1 49 nor has the court
qualified the decision in any later holding.150 Thus, the question of scope
remains open-whether, when, and to what extent should the rule be ap-
plied?
15 1
A few months after Arnold, the Tenth Circuit extended the rule in
United States v. Horn.152  Like the Ninth Circuit, the Tenth Circuit rec-
ognized the trend toward a mandatory rule. 53 Also, like in Arnold, the
court adopted the language requiring trial courts to "question the jury to
determine independently whether further deliberations might overcome
the deadlock." 154
Unlike Arnold, however, the Horn court held that the judge's deci-
sion to declare a mistrial constituted an abuse of discretion. 155 The ap-
pellate court explained:
Had the court, following the one-hour plus deliberation, called the
jurors back into court and made an inquiry as to their progress, and
had it asked whether they were close to a verdict, or, if deadlocked,
whether all members of the jury agreed that this was the situation,
then there would have been a good basis for arguing that manifest
necessity existed. The term "manifest" suggests apparent or that
which is clear and which requires no proof, that which is open, pal-
pable, incontrovertible. It is synonymous with evident, visible or
court did not further specify whether that "communication" must be explicit (e.g., through a jury
note) or could also be implicit (e.g., through jury body language). Id. Moreover, the court did not
attempt to limit the rule to criminal or civil cases, or to certain circumstances; instead, the court
merely declared that "the trial court must question the jury to determine independently whether
further deliberations might overcome the deadlock." Id.
148. See id
149. The case was not heard again in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
150. As of March 15, 2008, the only decision to fully examine Arnold was United States v.
Byrski, 854 F.2d 955 (7th Cir. 1988), which addressed Arnold, but did not assert a mandatory jury
inquiry rule. Thus, the Razmilovic court is the only court to have addressed the jury inquiry re-
quirement since Arnold. See infra Part III.C.
151. Part IV of this Comment assesses the appropriate scope of the mandatory nature of the
jury inquiry rule.
152. United States v. Horn, 583 F.2d 1124 (1978).
153. Id. at 1127; supra Part III.A.
154. Horn, 583 F.2d at 1127.
155. Id. at 1129.
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plain. It definitely does not mean something which exists only in
the mind of the judge.' 56
Like the Lansdown court, the Horn court noted the need for "some-
thing in addition" to the judge's instinct. 157 The court further defined this
something additional as evidence directly from the jury that is "visible,"
"palpable," and "incontrovertible."'' 58 More specifically, the trial judge
must get a statement from every juror through, arguably, a jury in-
quiry. 5 9 The Horn court suggested that a statement directly from a jury
accomplishes two significant objectives. First, the trial judge is further
assured that the jury is genuinely deadlocked.160 Second, the statement
can be used as palpable evidence if a subsequent appeal questions the
manifest necessity of the mistrial.
16
The Arnold and Horn decisions require trial courts in the Ninth and
Tenth Circuits to question purportedly deadlocked jurors prior to declar-
ing a mistrial. 62  However, these courts did not limit the scope of this
inquiry, which has resulted in a rule that is overly broad. 63 Possibly as a
result of its broad application, the rule has not received much attention
from other circuits. 164 The one circuit that has specifically addressed a
mandatory jury inquiry rule has not given a concrete rationale for declin-
ing to adopt it.
165
C. Other Circuits Have Either Failed to Address or Have Not Set
Forth an Adequate Rationale for Rejecting a Mandatory Jury
Inquiry Rule
The Razmilovic decision is the Second Circuit's most recent rejec-
tion of a mandatory jury inquiry rule.' 66 The Second Circuit had previ-
ously done so at the close of the 1970s in United States v. MacQueen.'67
156. Id. (internal citation omitted).
157. Id. at 1128-29.
158. Id. at 1129.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1127-29.
161. Id.
162. Arnold v. McCarthy, 566 F.2d 1377, 1387 (9th Cir. 1978); Horn, 583 F.2d at 1129.
163. See Arnold, 566 F.2d at 1387; Horn, 583 F.2d at 1129.
164. Other than the Ninth Circuit in Arnold, 566 F.2d at 1387, and the Tenth Circuit in Horn,
583 F.2d at 1129, the Second Circuit is the only circuit to directly address whether a jury inquiry rule
should be mandatory. See infra Part III.C.
165. See United States v. Razmilovic, 507 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2007); United States v. Mac-
Queen, 596 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1979).
166. Razmilovic, 507 F.3d. at 140 n.3.
167. MacQueen, 596 F.2d 76.
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With these two decisions, the Second Circuit represents the only circuit
to expressly reject a mandatory jury inquiry rule.168 Yet, neither of these
decisions provides any substantive rationale for such a rejection.
In MacQueen, the Second Circuit held that a retrial was not barred
by the Double Jeopardy Clause because the judge gave the jurors ade-
quate instructions regarding the possibility of reaching a partial ver-
dict. 169 In dicta, the court noted that because "every case turns on its own
facts," a rule mandating an inquiry into whether the jury had reached a
partial verdict was unnecessary. 170 Yet, other than this quotation, taken
from an earlier Second Circuit opinion, Drayton v. Hayes, the MacQueen
court failed to explain why a mandatory jury inquiry rule should be re-
jected. 171 Moreover, upon closer examination, the MacQueen court's
reliance on this quotation was misplaced.
The Drayton court took the quotation from Downum v. United
States,172 a Supreme Court decision holding that a retrial following dis-
charge of a first jury was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. 173
However, the Drayton court inaccurately cited Downum to support its
assertion that "per se rules are inappropriate in the mistrial context.'
74
The Downum court stated merely that "[e]ach case must turn on its
facts,"'175 which is a far stretch from the principle that mandatory rules
are always inappropriate. Moreover, the Supreme Court ultimately con-
cluded that any doubts concerning the propriety of a mistrial ought to be
resolved "in favor of the liberty of the citizen, rather than [through the]
exercise [of] . . . unlimited, uncertain, and arbitrary judicial discre-
tion. 176
When the Drayton court asserted that mandatory rules ought to be
avoided in the context of mistrials, it ignored the Downum court's ulti-
mate holding that any doubt concerning the propriety of a mistrial should
not be left to judicial discretion.' 77 In fact, Downum suggests that the
Supreme Court might actually prefer a mandatory rule that protects "the
168. While other circuits have failed to address the mandatory rule, none have gone as far as
the Second Circuit and expressly rejected the rule. See supra note 150.
169. MacQueen, 596 F.2d at 82.
170. Id. (citing Drayton v. Hayes, 589 F.2d 117, 122 (2d Cir. 1979)).
171. MacQueen, 596 F.2d at 82.
172. Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 737 (1963).
173. Id. at 737.
174. Drayton, 589 F.2d at 122.
175. Downum, 372 U.S. at 737.
176. Id. at 737-38 (citation omitted).
177. See Drayton, 589 F.2d at 122.
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liberty of the citizen" over "arbitrary judicial discretion., 178  Thus, the
Second Circuit's Drayton and MacQueen decisions rejecting mandatory
rules in the mistrial context are not grounded in reliable authority and fail
to provide any reasonable rationale for rejecting a mandatory jury inquiry
rule.
179
In Razmilovic, the court confined its rejection of the mandatory rule
to a footnote.' 80 Although the court admitted that "the step of [question-
ing] 181 the jury may be a reasonable step," the court rejected a mandatory
jury inquiry rule, reasoning instead that a mistrial decision was "properly
left to the sound discretion of the trial judge."'182  This rationale was
ironic, however, because the court ultimately concluded that the trial
judge did not use sound discretion.18 3 The court thus admitted that a jury
inquiry would have been reasonable in the case before it, but declined to
investigate further whether a jury inquiry might be justified in every
case. 184
The court's failure to give a concrete rationale suggests that it de-
clined to adopt a jury inquiry rule not because it disagreed with it, but
because such a rule was unnecessary to find an abuse of discretion on the
178. See Downum, 372 U.S. at 737.
179. A rationale for rejecting a mandatory jury inquiry rule that was not addressed in either
Second Circuit decision is the possibility that a jury inquiry followed by further deliberations might
unduly coerce the jurors into a verdict. The issue of coercion has been addressed in the context of
jury polling and Allen charges. See, e.g., United States v. Ajiboye, 961 F.2d 892 (9th Cir. 1992).
Yet, the Second Circuit did not address coercion in the context of a jury inquiry. This Comment
argues that a jury inquiry followed by further deliberations would not be unduly coercive. While
one law review article states that it could be coercive to poll a jury and then require them to go back
for more deliberations, the author provides no support for his assertion. Reichelt, supra note 1, at
586 (stating that the court erred by not addressing the "inherently coercive effect that interviewing
the entire panel of jurors individually would have had on the course of deliberations had the trial
court decided not to remove the dissenter from the panel"). On the contrary, the drafters of the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure confirm that the goal of the polling requirement is to prevent coer-
cion, not promote it, specifically noting that the purpose of the polling requirement is to ensure that
"each of the jurors approves of the verdict as returned [and] that no one has been coerced or induced
to sign a verdict to which he does not fully assent." FED. R. CRIM. P. 31 advisory comm. notes
(1998) (citing Humphries v. District of Columbia, 174 U.S. 190, 194 (1899)). Moreover, Rule 31(d)
gives a judge the option of sending the jury back to deliberate following a jury poll. Had drafters of
the Federal Rules considered such polling inherently and irreversibly coercive, it is unlikely that they
would have left judges with the option.
180. United States v. Razmilovic, 507 F.3d 130, 140 n.3 (2d Cir. 2007).
181. Id. Note that this is one such instance in which the court used the word "polling," yet
intended to address the concept of a jury inquiry. To avoid confusion, the quote above replaced the
word "polling" with "questioning."
182. Id.
183. Id. at 140.
184. Id. at 140 n.3.
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facts before it.' 85 Had Judge Wexler's abuse of discretion been less ob-
vious, the Second Circuit might have chosen to extend the mandatory
jury inquiry rule to provide a more identifiable basis upon which to rest
its holding.
Aside from the Second Circuit, no other circuit court has expressly
rejected the Ninth and Tenth Circuits' mandatory jury inquiry rule.
186
Given the trend toward jury inquiries and the failure of any court to pro-
vide a reasonable rationale for rejecting the rule, a mandatory jury in-
quiry rule would likely receive the general support of the circuits.
187
IV. THE SCOPE OF THE MANDATORY JURY INQUIRY RULE
A mandatory jury inquiry rule would require a trial judge to inquire
into the status of the jury when the jury appears deadlocked and the
judge is considering a mistrial. The rule would apply only in instances
where an inference could be drawn that the jury was deadlocked. A
judge could infer a jury deadlock from explicit actions taken by the jury,
such as a note. The judge could also draw the inference from jury con-
duct, for instance, long deliberations or tired body language. The rule
would not apply where justification for the mistrial is due to any impro-
priety by a party, the judge, or the jury.18 8 Additionally, the rule would
apply only in criminal cases.
189
185. See id. Specifically, the Second Circuit held that Judge Wexler abused his discretion
because he failed to discuss any of the following factors, which the Second Circuit held would have
helped accurately assess whether the jury was genuinely deadlocked: (1) a statement from the jury
that it cannot agree; (2) the length and complexity of the trial; (3) what actions, if any, that the trial
court took to determine whether the jury was deadlocked, which would include any alternatives the
court chose not to pursue. Id. at 137-38, 140 (citing Dunkerly v. Hogan, 579 F.2d 141, 148 (2d Cir.
1978) (holding that "the apparent availability of at least one alternative to a mistrial ... leads us to
conclude that mistrial was not a 'manifest necessity')).
186. See discussion supra note 150.
187. In his appellate brief to the Second Circuit, Mr. Borghese stated that he was "unaware of a
single appellate decision in any jurisdiction upholding a mistrial ... on the grounds of a genuinely
deadlocked jury, where ... the trial court did nothing to probe as to the genuineness of a purported
deadlock." Borghese Br., supra note 65, at 22-23.
188. A jury inquiry rule should not extend to situations of supposed jury tampering or impro-
priety because the rationale behind discharging a jury in those cases is that evidence was not pre-
sented fairly to the jury. Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 463 (1973). In such cases, where the
evidence is effectively "spoiled," it would "not serve 'the ends of public justice' to require that the
government proceed with its proof when, if it succeeded before the jury, it would automatically be
stripped of that success by an appellate court." Id. Thus, where there is a question of spoliation or
impropriety, the judge can declare a mistrial on his own discretion and without an inquiry. Id. With
a jury deadlock, on the other hand, the concern is not spoliation; rather, the jury is simply unable to
reach a verdict following a fairly presented trial. United States v. Horn, 583 F.2d 1124, 1126-27
(10th Cir. 1978) (citing Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 508-09 (1978)). In other words, had
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This Part will address the scope and application of the rule. Part
IV.A considers whether the rule should apply only in multi-defendant
trials, such as the Razmilovic trial, or whether it should also extend to
single-defendant trials. Part IV.B takes up the form of the jury inquiry,
namely whether it should be conducted in open court or outside of court,
and whether it should be conducted as to each individual juror or collec-
tively. Part IV.C sets forth the form of the instruction and the question
put to the jury when a trial judge decides to conduct a jury inquiry. And
Part IV.D provides a draft of the proposed jury inquiry rule, to be added
as an amendment to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 31.
A. Multiple-Defendant Trials Versus Single-Defendant Trials
In his brief to the Second Circuit in Razmilovic, Defendant-
Appellant DeGennaro asked that the court, "[a]t a minimum.., adopt a
per se rule for multi-defendant cases requiring in-person inquiry of the
jury to verify that the deadlock is intractable and that further delibera-
tions would be of no use, before discharging the jury."'190 The Second
Circuit declined Mr. DeGennaro's request and provided no adequate ra-
tionale for doing so.' 9'
Mr. DeGennaro argued for a mandatory jury inquiry rule that was
limited in scope to multiple-defendant cases. 192  The Razmilovic trial
provided a perfect example of the necessity of such a rule in the multi-
ple-defendant context. The jury was asked to render verdicts on three
the jury reached a verdict, it would have been valid. See Horn, 583 F.2d at 1127. Therefore, inquiry
into the jury's status could elicit a response that there exists an "apparent possibility" that the jury
may agree if given additional time. Id. at 1128.
189. Throughout this Comment, a jury inquiry has been compared to (and at times conflated
with) ajury poll. Rule 3 1(d) requires a jury poll after a verdict has been rendered at the request of a
party or at the judge's discretion. FED. R. CRIM. P. 3 1(d). However, unlike the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not contain a comparable jury polling
rule. Although this fact alone would not inhibit the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure from adopting
a jury inquiry rule, given the comparisons between jury polls and jury inquiries discussed in Part
IV.C, civil adoption may be an even more contentious issue. Thus, applying a jury inquiry rule in
civil cases is beyond the scope of this Comment.
190. DeGennaro Br., supra note 21, at 27 n.7.
191. Supra Parts tt, Ill.C; United States v. Razmilovic, 507 F.3d 130, 140 n.3 (2d Cir. 2007).
192. DeGennaro Br., supra note 21, at 27 n.7. Counsel for Mr. DeGennaro likely reasoned that
the court would be more inclined to adopt a mandatory rule if it was limited to a smaller subset of
cases. Although he could not be certain without consulting with Mr. DeGennaro's counsel, William
Hauptman, one of Mr. Jaeggi's attorneys, agreed that by "limiting it to cases where there are more
than one defendant, [Mr. DeGennaro would] not [be] asking the Second Circuit to come up with a
rule that applies in all criminal cases, which [courts] generally are loathe to do." E-mail from Wil-
liam Hauptman, Associate, Shearman & Sterling LLP, to Missy Mordy, author, Seattle University
School of Law (March 11, 2008, 09:35 EST) (on file with author) [hereinafter Hauptman E-mail].
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defendants and twenty-five counts.1 93 And, although the jury reached
unanimous verdicts on all but one of those counts, the judge nevertheless
declared a mistrial under the mistaken belief that the jury was genuinely
deadlocked. 1
94
As Mr. DeGennaro explained, there are a number of rationales for
applying the rule to multiple-defendant cases. First, as Razmilovic dem-
onstrated, there is the danger of discharging a jury where it is deadlocked
on only one count against one defendant but unanimous on the remaining
counts.1 95 Mr. DeGennaro noted that a multiple-defendant case with an
increased likelihood of a deadlock "well illustrates the wisdom of such a
rule, because further inquiry of the jury would very likely have revealed
that the jury was willing and able ... to deliver complete verdicts as to
two of the three defendants."'' 96 The greater chance of a deadlock leads to
greater risk that one defendant charged in a multiple-defendant case will
be subjected to double jeopardy.
The second rationale for applying the rule to multiple-defendant
cases is to ensure that a jury is aware of its option to declare a partial
verdict' 97 by inquiring into the status of the jury as to each count of the
indictment. 98 A judge could then advise (or remind) the jurors of their
option to declare a partial verdict, to which the jurors might declare a
verdict as to certain counts or certain defendants. 99 An additional ration-
ale for the rule is efficiency: partial verdicts extinguish certain counts,
and even certain defendants, from being retried, sparing time and re-
sources. 200
The final rationale for adopting a mandatory rule in multiple-
defendant cases is to provide judges with clear and unambiguous evi-
dence that there is manifest necessity for a mistrial. A jury inquiry would
put the question to the jury, not the judge, whether "further deliberation
might produce some agreement., 20 ' Therefore, instead of relying on judi-
cial instinct, a judge would have specific evidence that each juror be-
193. DeGennaro Br., supra note 21, at 2-3.
194. Id. at 13.
195. Id. at 18; Borghese Br., supra note 65, at 10.
196. DeGennaro Br., supra note 21, at 27 n.7.
197. FED. R. CRIM. P. 3 1(b).
198. DeGennaro Br., supra note 21, at 18; Borghese Br., supra note 65, at 10.
199. FED. R. CRIM. P. 3 1(d).
200. See, e.g., United States v. Razmilovic, 507 F.3d 130, 142 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that the
Double Jeopardy Clause barred two of the three defendant-appellants from being retried). Indeed,
using a jury inquiry would have in fact saved the money that Judge Wexler thought he was saving by
not conducting an inquiry. DeGennaro Br., supra note 21, at 14-15.
201. See United States v. Goldstein, 479 F.2d 1061, 1069 (2d Cir. 1973).
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lieved it fruitless to continue deliberations. 2 If a defendant believed the
discharge was an improper use of judicial discretion, the appellate court
could rest its decision on unquestionable evidence that the trial judge's
decision to declare a mistrial was manifestly necessary.20 3
These rationales also support extension of the rule to single-
defendant cases. First, single-defendant cases often involve multiple
counts; thus, as with multi-defendant cases, a judicial inquiry might re-
veal that the jury has reached a partial verdict. If so, the judge could ex-
tinguish some of the counts against the defendant. 20 4 Second, by extin-
guishing some counts, the charges brought against the defendant in a
subsequent trial would be limited to those that the first jury did not de-
cide unanimously.
205
Third, as with the multiple-defendant cases, a trial judge would hear
firsthand from the jury the extent to which they were genuinely dead-
locked. Using such concrete information from each individual juror, the
judge could determine whether the jury should continue deliberations or
be discharged and a mistrial declared. 206 This third justification validates
extension of the jury inquiry rule to cases involving just one defendant
and even just one count: in such cases, a statement directly from the jury
provides assurance that a mistrial is manifestly necessary.
In sum, the rationales for extending the rule to multiple-defendant
cases are also applicable in single-defendant cases, and even single-count
cases. Therefore, the jury inquiry rule should not be limited to multiple-
defendant cases. Having determined that the rule should apply to both
types of cases, the next subpart considers how the inquiry should be con-
ducted.
B. The Form of the Jury Inquiry
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure codify polling as an ac-
ceptable method of ascertaining whether the jury's verdict was unani-
mous.2 0 7 Although this Comment focuses on jury inquiries, not jury
polls, both methods involve a form of juror questioning. Likewise, both
tools require jurors to disclose subjective beliefs to a judge, and both en-
202. See United States v. Horn, 583 F.2d 1124, 1128 (10th Cir. 1978).
203. See id.
204. FED. R. CRIM. P. 31 (d).
205. See, e.g., Dissell v. Adams, 115 A.D.2d 1006, 1007-08 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985).
206. See Horn, 583 F.2d at 1128-29.
207. FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(d).
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counter many of the same concerns.20 8 Given the lack of any formal jury
inquiry rule, and given the similarities between a jury poll and a jury in-
quiry, this Comment will now discuss the appropriate form of a jury in-
quiry by examining the polling process.
Rule 3 1(d) is silent as to the precise way in which a jury poll should
be conducted; however, the advisory committee notes to the 1998
amendments make clear that each juror should be polled individually.
2 0 9
In King v. Ford Motor Co., the court held that jury polls can be con-
ducted using "any formulation that serves to ascertain that the verdict
was unanimous. 2 °10  A poll may not, however, be conducted where "the
trial judge's interrogation during a jury poll serves to coerce a reluctant
juror into changing his vote. 2 1
Despite the similarities noted above, there are also a number of dis-
tinctions between a jury poll and a jury inquiry. The most important dis-
tinction is the completion of a jury poll after the jury has reached a ver-
208. As is discussed in this Part, the main concerns with both jury polls and jury inquiries
center around coercion. See King v. Ford Motor Co., 209 F.3d 886, 896 n.7 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing
Green v. Zant, 738 F.2d 1529, 1537-38 (1 lth Cir. 1984)); see also Arnold v. McCarthy, 566 F.2d
1377, 1386-87 (9th Cir. 1978) (noting that the final factor a judge must consider when determining
whether mistrial is manifestly necessary is to consider "the effects of possible exhaustion and the
impact which coercion of further deliberations might have on the verdict").
209. The advisory committee notes state the following:
Currently, Rule 3 1(d) is silent on the precise method of polling the jury. Thus, a
court in its discretion may conduct the poll collectively or individually. As one court has
noted, although the prevailing view is that the method used is a matter within the discre-
tion of the trial court, United States v. Miller, 59 F.3d 417, 420 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing
cases), the preference, nonetheless of the appellate and trial courts, seems to favor indi-
vidual polling. Id. (citing cases). That is the position taken in the American Bar Associa-
tion Standards for Criminal Justice § 15-4.5. Those sources favoring individual polling
observe that conducting a poll of the jurors collectively saves little time and does not al-
ways adequately insure that an individual juror who has been forced to join the majority
during deliberations will voice dissent from a collective response. On the other hand, an
advantage to individual polling is the "likelihood that it will discourage post-trial efforts
to challenge the verdict on allegations of coercion on the part of some of the jurors."
Miller, 59 F.3d at 420 (citing Audette v. lsaksen Fishing Corp., 789 F.2d 956, 961 n.6
(1st Cir. 1986)).
The Committee is persuaded by the authorities and practice that there are advan-
tages of conducting an individual poll of the jurors. Thus, the rule requires that the ju-
rors be polled individually when a polling is requested, or when polling is directed sua
sponte by the court. The amendment, however, leaves to the court the discretion as to
whether to conduct a separate poll for each defendant, each count of the indictment or
complaint, or on other issues.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 31 advisory comm. notes (1998) (emphasis added).
210. King, 209 F.3d at 896 n.7 (citing Green, 738 F.2d at 1537-38).
211. King, 209 F.3d at 896 n.7 (citing Green, 738 F.2d at 1537-38).
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dict. The purpose of the jury poll is to confirm the jury's unanimity. 212
On the other hand, a jury inquiry is done to determine only whether the
jury could potentially reach a verdict in a reasonable amount of time.213
Both seek to determine whether the jury should continue to deliberate or
should be discharged. However, a jury inquiry is arguably less intimidat-
ing 214 because there is less riding on a juror's answer-a jury inquiry
asks only whether the jurors should continue to deliberate.2 15 In contrast,
a jury poll asks the jury to confirm a verdict that was supposedly unani-
mous. 2 16 Should a juror disagree with the majority during a poll, the re-
sult is to invalidate a purportedly valid verdict and a judge must decide
whether to order jurors to continue to deliberate or to declare a mis-
trial.217 But should a juror disagree with the majority during an inquiry,
then the worst that would happen is that the jurors would be required to
continue to deliberate and attempt to reach a verdict.218
Given these differences between a jury poll and a jury inquiry, an
inquiry need not be structured exactly like a poll. While coercion and
intimidation are still central concerns to be considered with respect to a
jury inquiry, the risk that those factors will affect a jury verdict is less
apparent with a jury inquiry. Accordingly, a jury inquiry need not be
structured exactly as the advisory committee has recommended for a jury
poll. Instead, a jury inquiry could be done in any number of ways, in-
212. FED. R. CRIM. P. 3 1(d).
213. See United States v. Horn, 583 F.2d 1124, 1128 (10th Cir. 1978).
214. For clarity, this Comment distinguishes between "intimidation" and "coercion." As used
in this Comment, "intimidation" refers to the pressure that may result after the poll or inquiry. More
specifically, as discussed in this Part, intimidation occurs when the jurors are sent back to the jury
room to deliberate following a non-unanimous poll or following an inquiry in which at least one
juror believes that reaching a verdict is possible. "Coercion," on the other hand, is used to refer to
the pressure a juror might feel when stating his opinion in open court or even merely to a judge out
of court.
215. Horn, 583 F.2d at 1128.
216. United States v. Love, 597 F.2d 81, 84 (6th Cir. 1979).
217. Gov't of the Virgin Islands v. Hercules, 875 F.2d 414, 418, 419 n.7 (citing Love, 597 F.2d
at 84; United States v. Morris, 612 F.2d 483, 490 (10th Cir. 1979)); see also Hercules, 875 F.2d at
419 n.8 (noting that, "[i]f upon the poll there is not unanimous concurrence, the jury may be directed
to retire for further deliberations or may be discharged").
218. See Horn, 583 F.2d at 1128-29. When there is a split opinion among the jurors as to
whether a verdict can be reached in a reasonable amount of time, the judge should send the jurors
back to continue deliberations. See, e.g., Transcript of Proceedings at 7-10, United States v. Cook,
No. CR 05-424-TSZ (W.D. Wash. Mar. 20, 2007) (docket no. 310-2). Only when all of the jurors
agree that further deliberations would be fruitless should the judge declare a mistrial under a finding
of manifest necessity.
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cluding: (1) individually in open court; 219 (2) as a group in open court;
(3) as a group outside of court;22° or (4) individually outside of court.
None of these methods is perfect. In the following subparts, the positive
and negative aspects of each method are discussed.
1. Questioning Each Juror Individually in Open Court
While Rule 3 1(d) does not restrict the jury polling process to any
specific form, 221 a poll might be coercive given the circumstances in
which a juror's vote is disclosed.22 2  A jury poll is often conducted in
open court after the judge or jury foreman has announced the verdict.
223
Generally, per the advisory committee, the judge asks each juror indi-
vidually whether the vote of the jury was his individual vote.224
In United States v. Sexton, the Fifth Circuit held that a juror was
improperly coerced when, during the poll, the court asked whether the
verdict of the foreman was her verdict and she answered that she "didn't
vote either way., 225  Citing two other appellate court decisions,22 6 the
Sexton court held that coercion is most often found where a juror is
found to have "voted under the compulsion of the Court., 227 In short, the
court implied that coercion often results when the judge forces a juror to
state his or her verdict in open court.228 In those cases, "the polling pro-
,,229
cedure itself creates a coercive... situation.
219. For this Comment, "in open court" refers to when a juror is questioned in front of all
parties and jurors in front of a court reporter. As a result, the juror's individual "vote" will be re-
corded by the court reporter and will be part of the official trial record. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 31
advisory comm. notes (1998).
220. For this Comment, "outside of court" or "out of court" will mean not in open court. These
types of hearings may otherwise be considered ex parte or in camera proceedings, but it is important
to note that proceedings that are "outside of court" might not include all parties of record. This
Comment suggests, however, that these "outside-of-court" inquiries should become part of the offi-
cial trial record in some way, likely by requiring the judge to provide a synopsis on the record of
what was discussed once the judge and jury return to the courtroom.
221. King v. Ford Motor Co., 209 F.3d 886, 896 n.7 (citing Audette v. lsaksen Fishing Corp.,
789 F.2d 956, 959 (1st Cir. 1986)).
222. United States v. Sexton, 456 F.2d 961, 966 (5th Cir. 1972) (citing Bruce v. Chestnut
Farms-Chevy Chase Dairy, 126 F.2d 224, 225 (D.C. Cir. 1942)).
223. FED. R. CRIM. P. 3 1(d).
224. FED. R. CRIM. P. 31 advisory comm. notes (1998).
225. Sexton, 456 F.2d at 964.
226. United States v. McCoy, 429 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Matthews v. United States, 252
A.2d 505 (D.C. 1969).
227. Sexton, 456 F.2d at 964.
228. See id. at 966 (citing Williams v. United States, 419 F.2d 740, 751-52 (D.C. Cir. 1969)).
229. Sexton, 456 F.2d at 966. (citing Williams, 419 F.2d at 751-52).
Seattle University Law Review
Because courts have found the open-court polling procedure to be a
source of coercion, an inquiry in open court might not be the best op-
230tion. Jurors may feel singled out and, therefore, reluctant to state their
honest opinions in front of the parties, the attorneys, the judge, and the
other jurors. The pressure inherent in stating one's opinion in front of
such a cast of individuals is unquestionable. 231 For example, a juror who
disagrees with the majority might nonetheless state that he agrees be-
cause agreeing is more appealing than being singled out as the lone dis-
232senter. Thus, while extremely important to collect information regard-
ing the jury's status, to gather this information in open court could make
the information unreliable.233
2. Questioning the Jury as a Group, Through the Jury Foreman, in
Open Court
Courts most often find undue coercion when the jurors are polled as
a collective group in open court.234 Though some courts have noted that
,,215a jury inquiry done "as a group is an acceptable alternative, question-
ing the jury as a group retains the possibility that the jurors will feel co-
erced.236 Like individual questioning in open court, a group statement in
open court leaves open the possibility that a disagreeing juror would not
speak up given the pressures inherent in a courtroom full of attorneys,
judges, and jurors.237 Moreover, the Third Circuit in Webb warned that,
in many cases, questioning the foreman does not represent the unani-
230. Sexton, 456 F.2d at 964, 966; see also Kesley v. United States, 47 F.2d 453, 454 (5th Cir.
1931) (noting that a judge may not use public reprimand to coerce jurors to reach a conclusion).
231. See Kesley, 47 F.2d at 454 ("No juror should be induced to agree to a verdict by a fear that
a failure so to agree will be regarded by the public as reflecting upon either his intelligence, or his
integrity." (quoting State v. Bybee, 17 Kan. 462 (1877)).
232. Douglas Gary Lichtman, The Deliberative Lottery: A Thought Experiment in Jury Reform,
34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 133, 152 (1996) (noting that "a juror who makes such a stand is forced to
return to the jury room to continue deliberation face-to-face with that same (now hostile) majority,"
which "is not exactly a tempting alternative").
233. See id.
234. FED. R. CRIM. P. 31 advisory comm. notes (1998).
235. United States v. See, 505 F.2d 845, 851 (9th Cir. 1974).
236. See United States ex rel. Webb v. Court of Common Pleas, 516 F.2d 1034, 1044 (3d Cir.
1975) (where the judge questioned only the jury foreman, court held that it was "possible that one or
more of the jurors here stood sufficiently in awe of the authority of the court or were sufficiently
swayed by the court's demand for orderly proceedings that they were deterred from making unsolic-
ited comments on the jury's progress").
237. Lichtman, supra note 232, at 152; see also Kesley v. United States, 47 F.2d 453, 454 (5th
Cir. 1931).
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mous decision of the jurors.238 In fact, in Webb, the Third Circuit held
that the trial court's questioning of the foreman was insufficient to estab-
lish that "the foreman's responses ... represented the unanimous opinion
of the jury, or even that of a majority of the panel. 239
Given that coercion is still inherent and that unanimity of the jury is
questionable given the collective statement spoken by the jury foreman,
questioning the jury as a group in open court is likely the least reliable
method to conduct a jury inquiry.
3. Questioning the Jury as a Group, Outside of Court
As discussed in the previous subpart, questioning the jury as a
group might lead to an unreliable inquiry.240 The Webb court noted that
the statement of a jury foreman might not be the unanimous decision of
the jury.241 While an outside-of-court jury inquiry would not present the
coercion inherent in an open-court inquiry,2 4 2 timid jurors might still be
less inclined to disagree with the majority unless explicitly asked their
opinions.243 As a result, any type of group inquiry is suspect for failing
to represent the unanimous conclusions of the group. Additionally, as
discussed in the next subpart, all communications made outside of court
are also suspect and should be avoided, especially when an inquiry might
be the basis for a later appeal.
4. Questioning Each Juror Individually, Outside of Court
A final option is to question each juror individually, outside of
court. This could be done in a number of ways, such as: (1) requiring
each juror to respond to the inquiry in the judge's chambers; 244 or (2)
requiring each juror to respond to the inquiry in writing.245 To require
each juror to respond individually and without the inherent pressure of a
surrounding group of jurors, attorneys, or parties, provides the least coer-
238. Webb, 516 F.2d at 1044 (noting that there was "no clear showing that the foreman's re-
sponses here necessarily represented the unanimous opinion of the jury, or even that of a majority of
the panel").
239. Id.
240. Supra Part III.B.2.
241. Webb, 516 F.2d at 1044.
242. Kesley, 47 F.2d at 454.
243. Lichtman, supra note 232, at 152; see also supra Parts IV.B. 1-2.
244. This may be done in what is termed an ex parte proceeding, where at least one attorney is
present during the discussion. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1241 (8th ed. 2004).
245. Although this Comment does not elaborate further into this written method of an inquiry,
it is an option that may be considered if a mandatory jury inquiry rule is adopted.
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cive setting; therefore, this method would likely produce the most reli-
able juror responses.
Nevertheless, an out-of-court inquiry is rife with problems, the
foremost being that it is open to attack on grounds of impropriety. 46
Consequently, an out-of-court method would require two additional
safeguards. First, if done out of court, the inquiry must nevertheless be
documented. This may be done either by using a court reporter during
the out-of-court inquiry or by requiring the judge to provide a synopsis of
247the inquiry in open court. If no official record is made of the inquiry,
there would be no clear evidence of a genuine deadlock and, thus, one of
246. Almost all courts conduct jury polls in open court. See, e.g., United States v. Grosso, 358
F.2d 154, 160 (3d Cir. 1966) (noting that the "object of a jury poll is 'to give each juror an opportu-
nity, before the verdict is recorded, to declare in open court his assent to the verdict which the fore-
man has returned and thus to enable the court and the parties to ascertain with certainty that a
unanimous verdict has in fact been recorded and that no juror has been coerced or induced to agree
to a verdict to which he has not fully assented") (quoting Miranda v. United States, 255 F.2d 9, 16-
17 (1st Cir. 1958) (emphasis added and in original)), rev'd on other grounds, 390 U.S. 62 (1968).
While no rule or holding requires a court to conduct a jury poll in open court, courts commonly
construe the polling rule as requiring an open court dialogue. Grosso, 358 F.2d at 160. There are
two commonly cited rationales for conducting a poll in open court. First, a poll is conducted in open
court merely out of convenience: the jurors will already be in open court when the verdict is read.
See, e.g., Gov't of the Virgin Islands v. Hercules, 875 F.2d 414, 418, 419 n.8 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing
STANDARDS RELATING TO TRIAL BY JURY, supra note 110, § 5.5). Second, a poll is conducted in
open court to prevent future appeals grounded in the parties' speculation as to the unanimity of the
poll. United States v. Miller, 59 F.3d 417, 420 (3d Cir. 1995); Audette v. lsaksen Fishing Corp., 789
F.2d 956, 961 n.6 (Ist Cir. 1986). If done in open court, the parties will hear the poll firsthand and
an official record will be made, greatly limiting any speculation on unanimity. Miller, 59 F.3d at
420; Audette, 789 F.2d at 961 n.6. With a jury inquiry, on the other hand, neither rationale necessar-
ily applies. First, convenience is not always a consideration because a jury will likely be deliberat-
ing, thus not in open court, when the jury inquiry is deemed necessary. See, e.g., United States v.
Horn, 583 F.2d 1124, 1125, 1129 (10th Cir. 1978) (holding an inquiry may have been appropriate
when the jury sent a note from the jury room). Second, unlike a poll, in which a potential verdict
rests on the outcome, an inquiry is done when there is no potential verdict and, therefore, a verdict
does not rest on the outcome of the inquiry. See, e.g., Horn, 583 F.2d at 1128 (noting that the central
inquiry is "whether there was a possibility that the jury could reach a verdict," not whether the ver-
dict was unanimous and thus could be entered as final). In sum, an open court dialogue may not be
necessary in the jury inquiry context. As will be discussed in this Part, however, maintaining the
integrity of the court and establishing a record from which the court can cite in future appellate pro-
ceedings may still be undermined by an out-of-court inquiry.
247. William Hauptman notes the rationale behind making a record of information discussed in
an ex parte discussion:
There is no rule about what goes on the record, but if the trial court wants to keep his job
[and to maintain the integrity of the court], he will make sure that everything an appellate
court will need to see is on the record. In situations where the court needs to tell the par-
ties what happened behind closed doors, the court will usually just let everyone know
generally what happened and what their decision is based on that.
Hauptman E-mail, supra note 192.
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the important evidentiary benefits of the inquiry would be lost.248 More-
over, without a record, the parties might question the propriety of the
inquiry, which would once more defeat its evidentiary purpose.
The second safeguard recognizes the danger of impropriety where
the discussion between a judge and a juror goes unchecked by the par-
ties.249 Without the parties in the room, no one with a stake in the out-
come can verify the substance of the discussion.250  To ensure that the
inquiry is honest and reliable, the second safeguard requires that both
parties be present during the inquiry. 251 The ultimate effect, then, is that
an out-of-court inquiry would not be a simple one-on-one conversation
with a judge. Rather, an out-of-court inquiry would be no different than
an open-court inquiry, resulting in the same inherent pressures.
252
While none of these methods is perfect, the simplest and most reli-
able option is likely an open-court inquiry conducted of each individual
juror. First, an individual inquiry is preferable. As the advisory commit-
tee to Rule 3 1 (d) explained, "conducting a poll of the jurors collectively
saves little time and does not always adequately insure that an individual
juror who has been forced to join the majority during deliberations will
voice dissent from a collective response." 253 An advantage to question-
ing each juror individually is that there is less likelihood that the verdict
will later be challenged as coercive. 254 Second, an open-court inquiry is
preferable. An open-court inquiry may cause some jurors to hesitate to
248. Id.; Horn, 583 F.2d at1 127-28.
249. William Hauptman notes that
any ex parte contact with a jury raises serious issues that appellate courts are very wary
of. No one is supposed to speak with a juror about a case unless it is in court, with the
lawyers and judge present. The problem is [not just] one of appearances, but also one of
potential jury tampering, influencing, etc.
Hauptman E-mail, supra note 192.
250. Under the Code of Conduct for United States Judges, Canon 3 notes that judges "should
be patient, dignified, respectful, and courteous to ... jurors" and should "neither initiate nor consider
ex parte communications on the merits, or procedures affecting the merits, of a pending or impend-
ing proceeding." CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES, Canon 3, § A(3)-(4), available
at http://www.uscourts.gov/guide/vol 2/ ch 1. html#1. This Canon suggests that judges are advised
to maintain a distance from jurors and should not hold ex parte proceedings unless authorized by law
or with the consent of the parties. Id. While an out-of-court inquiry would not necessarily violate
this Canon, the Code of Conduct suggests that at least one other party should be present at the pro-
ceeding, that the parties consent to the proceeding, and that the proceeding become part of the re-
cord. See id.
251. Id.
252. Supra Parts lV.B.1-2.
253. FED. R. CRIM. P. 31 advisory comm. notes (1998).
254. Id. (citing United States v. Miller, 59 F.3d 417, 420 (3d Cir. 1995); Audette v. Isaksen
Fishing Corp., 789 F.2d 956, 961 n.6 (Ist Cir. 1986)).
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speak up or respond truthfully, thus making the inquiry potentially unre-
liable. Nevertheless, the alternative is an out-of-court inquiry, which
either includes the above-mentioned safeguards, and so effectively be-
comes an open-court inquiry, or is subject to allegations of impropriety
or jury tampering.25 5 Such allegations could nullify not only the jury in-
quiry, but the entire outcome of a trial. Given the greater risk associated
with an out-of-court inquiry, the preferable choice is an individual, open-
court inquiry which, much like a jury poll, documents the inquiry on the
official record and is conducted before all parties and counsel.
C. The Question to Be Asked of the Jury
In Bruce v. Chestnut Farms-Chevy Chase Dairy, the D.C. Circuit
set out what it considered the least coercive method of conducting a jury
poll. 256 The court noted that "[t]he correct practice, when a poll of the
jury is asked, is for the clerk to call the roll and ask each juror as his
name is called to answer-for the plaintiff, or-for the defendant."
2 57
The court further advised that "it is both unwise and undesirable that the
Court should enter into an argument with the juror or require an explana-
tion. ' '251 While the court's holding was in the context of jury polling as
opposed to a jury inquiry, similar guidelines should be followed to avoid
a jury inquiry "procedure [that] itself creates a coercive or confusing
situation."
259
First, the court should adopt a standard procedure and standard in-
struction to read to the jurors, such as the following:
There has been some indication that you, the members of the jury,
have been unable to come to a collective decision as to the defen-
dant(s) in this case. The Court greatly appreciates your service;
however, the Court also wants to ensure that your service does not
become unduly burdensome or coerced. To avoid against undue
pressures, I will be asking you whether there is any reasonable pos-
sibility, however slight, of reaching a unanimous verdict in this
case. The following question will be asked of each of you indivi-
dually: "Do you feel there is a reasonable probability that the jury
can reach a unanimous verdict as to each count if sent back to the
jury room for further deliberation?" Remember that this question
255. Hauptman E-mail, supra note 192.
256. Bruce v. Chestnut Farms-Chevy Chase Dairy, 126 F.2d 224, 225 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. See Williams v. United States, 419 F.2d 740, 750 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (Wright, J., dissenting).
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refers to each count you are charged with deciding. Also, when an-
swering, do not give any indication as to your vote on each count.
This inquiry is being done only to determine whether further delib-
erations will be in the best interest of this court and in the best inter-
est of the parties, or whether this court might be required to declare
a mistrial.
There are a few important parts to this instruction. First, the in-
struction focuses on the fact that the jury should answer whether there is
a reasonable probability of reaching a verdict. 261  The defendant has a
"valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal. 262
Thus, the defendant should have his fate decided by the original tribunal
if there is any reasonable probability of reaching a verdict.
Second, the instruction stresses that the jury will be answering
whether it might reach a decision as to each count in the indictment. By
asking about each count, the judge can determine whether the jury might
be able to reach at least a partial verdict, and if so, the judge can then
instruct or remind the jury of the partial verdict option.263 This instruc-
tion will prevent mistrials in situations where the judge does not instruct
the jury on their option to declare a partial verdict.
264
Third, the instruction stresses that the members of the jury are not
stating their decision as to the fate of the defendant. Rather, jurors are
260. The Jury Instructions Committee of the Ninth Circuit suggests a similar procedure and
instruction for determining whether the jury is deadlocked:
Initially, the court may ask the foreperson the following questions:
"Is there anything else the court can do to assist in the jury's deliberations?"
"Would an additional instruction assist in your deliberations?"
"Would the rereading of any testimony help the jury reach a conclusion?"
If the foreperson's response to all three questions is, "No," then inquire "In your
opinion, is the jury hopelessly deadlocked?" If the foreperson's response is, "Yes," ask
the foreperson, "Is there a reasonable probability that the jury can reach a unanimous
verdict if sent back to the jury room for further deliberation?"
If the foreperson's response is, "No," then ask the following question of each mem-
ber of the panel, "Do you feel there is a reasonable probability that the jury can reach a
unanimous verdict if sent back to the jury room for further deliberation?" The court may
wish to poll the jury and record their answers which must be a yes or no.
JURY INSTRUCTIONS COMM. OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT, supra note 14, § 5.5C.
261. See United States v. Horn, 583 F.2d 1124, 1128 (10th Cir. 1978) (noting that the inquiry is
"whether there was a possibility that the jury could reach a verdict" and if "there existed no apparent
possibility" then the court could be assured that the jury was genuinely deadlocked).
262. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503 (1978) (citations omitted).
263. FED. R. CRIM. P. 3 1(b).
264. See DeGennaro Br., supra note 21, at 16, 18; United States v. Razmilovic, 507 F.3d 130,
139 (2d Cir. 1978) (citations omitted) (noting that the judge failed to instruct jurors of their right to
declare a partial verdict).
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stating only whether there is a possibility of reaching a verdict on any
265 iparticular count. When instructing the jury, the trial judge should
stress that the jurors are not to state their determinations as to guilt or
innocence.266
Finally, the instruction stresses to the jurors that their answers to the
inquiry should be a simple "yes" or "no" and should not depend on
whether the jurors have already decided a verdict as to any count. In
other words, if the jury already decided that a defendant was guilty as to
one count, the members of the jury should answer with a simple "yes,"
not a statement such as "we have already decided that count." The trial
court should emphasize that the purpose of the inquiry is not to deter-
mine whether decisions have been made.2 67 Instead, the inquiry seeks to
determine whether a final verdict could be reached in a reasonable
amount of time.268
D. The Timing of the Jury Inquiry
"If the [jury] poll reveals a lack of unanimity," Rule 3 1 (d) permits a
trial judge to "direct the jury to deliberate further., 269  Various courts
emphasized this part of Rule 3 1 (d), holding that it was not error to direct
the jury to return to the jury room for further deliberations following a
non-unanimous jury poll.270 Given the similarities between a poll and an
271inquiry, 1 it follows that directing the jury to continue to deliberate after
the inquiry would also be proper.272
Although a jury poll is conducted only after a verdict has purport-
edly been reached, a judge may require jurors to deliberate further if the
265. See Horn, 583 F.2d at 1128.
266. Reichelt, supra note 1, at 618 n.282 (citing jury inquiry instructions from Hon. Joel D.
Horton, District Court Judge, Idaho Fourth Judicial District, which stress the following: "If you
conclude that you are hopelessly deadlocked and that further deliberations will not be fruitful, the
presiding juror should indicate ... the fact that the jury is deadlocked, without revealing the numeri-
cal division of the jury panel .. ") (emphasis added).
267. See id; see also JURY INSTRUCTIONS COMM. OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT, supra note 14,
§ 5.5C.
268. See Horn, 583 F.2d at 1128-29.
269. FED. R. CRIM. P. 3 1(d).
270. Deane v. Dunbar, 777 F.2d 871, 875 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Lee, 532 F.2d 911,
915 (3d Cir. 1976); Castleberry v. NRM Corp., 470 F.2d 1113, 1117 (10th Cir. 1972); United States
v. Edwards, 469 F.2d 1362, 1367 (5th Cir. 1972); Bruce v. Chestnut Farms-Chevy Chase Dairy, 126
F.2d 224, 225 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
271. Supra Part IV.B.
272. This conclusion is even further supported by the fact that a juror directed to continue
deliberating following a jury inquiry is less likely to be coerced than a juror sent back to deliberate
following a poll. See supra Part IV.B.
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poll reveals a lack of unanimity. Thus, a jury poll is not necessarily
done at the end of a trial; rather, it is done prior to entering judgment and
discharging the jury.274 A jury inquiry, also done prior to the end of trial,
is no different. More importantly, the policy of a jury inquiry is to pre-
vent judges from hastily declaring mistrials. To effectuate that policy,
the mandatory jury inquiry rule must allow for additional deliberation
after the jury inquiry and so long as the jury is not genuinely dead-
locked.27 5
Because an inquiry may necessarily extend a trial, it should be done
only when there is an explicit or implicit indication from the jurors that
they are deadlocked and when a judge is considering a mistrial. 76 Given
that the decision is ultimately in the hands of a judge, this device rests at
judge's discretion. However, like jury polling, it would also be appropri-
ate to allow parties to request jury inquiries. 277  But, unlike a poll, be-
cause an inquiry could be requested at several points in a trial, the judge
need not conduct an inquiry at the behest of every party motion.2 78 In-
273. FED. R. CRIM. P. 3 I(d) ("If the poll reveals a lack of unanimity, the court may direct the
jury to deliberate further or may declare a mistrial and discharge the jury.") (emphasis added).
274. See, e.g., Castleberry, 470 F.2d at 1117; Bruce, 126 F.2d at 225; Alusa v. Lehigh Valley
R.R. Co., 26 F.2d 950, 950 (W.D.N.Y 1928) ("The right to the polling ofajury... may be exercised
at any time before the verdict is recorded.").
275. See United States v. Horn, 583 F.2d 1124, 1128 (10th Cir. 1978) ("If the trial judge in this
case had ... called the jury into the courtroom and had inquired of it what progress, if any, had been
made, and whether there was a possibility that the jury could reach a verdict, and if the jury had
reported that there existed no apparent possibility, there would be something in the record on which
to base a conclusion that there was manifest necessity for the declaring of a mistrial.").
276. Of course, this raises the question: when, exactly, should an inquiry be conducted? In
other words, if the inquiry is done a few days or even hours prior to the declaration of a mistrial, is
this sufficient to establish that the jury was still deadlocked at the time the mistrial was declared?
Given this concern, it would be advisable to conduct an inquiry just prior to the declaration of the
mistrial. And, although it will most likely be within the discretion of the trial judge, a few hours
might not be sufficient given the circumstances. But see, e.g., United States v. Cook, 07-30289, 288
F. App'x 351, 2008 WL 2872629, at *1 (9th Cir. July 24, 2008) (affirming Western District of
Washington District Court Judge Thomas S. Zilly's decision that no mistrial was warranted after
Judge Zilly questioned the jury whether further deliberations would be fruitful; the responses indi-
cated that the jurors were not hopelessly deadlocked; Judge Zilly sent the jurors back to deliberate;
and only five to ten minutes after sending them back to deliberate, the jury returned a verdict); see
also Transcript of Proceedings, United States v. Cook, No. CR 05-424-TSZ (W.D. Wash. Mar. 20,
2007) (docket no. 310-2).
277. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(d) ("the court must on a party's request, or may on its own, poll
the jurors individually").
278. Id. ("the court must on a party's request . . . poll the jurors individually") (emphasis
added).
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stead, a party should provide some implicit or explicit evidence that the
jury is deadlocked prior to being afforded a jury inquiry. 279
E. The Language of the Jury Inquiry Rule
A mandatory jury inquiry rule should be added to Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 31 to require a jury inquiry prior to declaring a mis-
trial. 280 The Ninth and Tenth Circuits provide a good framework for the
rule; 281 however, to better define those instances in which the inquiry
must be conducted, the rule should be phrased as follows:
Jury Inquiry. An inquiry into the status of the members of a jury
shall be conducted prior to the declaration of a mistrial and dis-
charge of the jury when such a mistrial is the result of what the
court assumes to be a deadlocked or hung jury. Such an inquiry
shall be directed to each juror individually and shall be done in open
court. In conducting such an inquiry, the court must ask, specifi-
cally, whether each member of the jury believes that there is a rea-
sonable probability that the jury can, in a reasonable amount of
time, reach a verdict as to each count and as to each defendant of
the case at bar if sent back to the jury room for further deliberation.
The court may conduct such a jury inquiry on its own or at the re-
quest of a party if there is any indication, explicit or implicit, that
the jury is deadlocked or hung.
279. This also leaves open the question of whether there should be a limit to the number ofjury
inquiries that may be done throughout the course of a jury's deliberations. Although not binding on
the issue of a jury inquiry, the Ninth Circuit has held that giving more than one Allen charge to a
given jury is per se error. United States v. Seawell, 550 F.2d 1159, 1162-63 (9th Cir. 1977). Simi-
larly, in United States v. Cook, the Ninth Circuit cited Seawell when it affirmed a trial court's deci-
sion to conduct a jury inquiry after it had given an Allen charge. Cook, No. 07-30289, 2008 WL
2872629, at *1 (9th Cir. July 24, 2008). The court held that "[u]nder the circumstances, asking the
jury to return to the jury room and to continue deliberations did not amount to giving a second Allen
instruction in violation of United States v. Seawell." Cook, 2008 WL 2872692, at * 1. Therefore,
like the question of when the jury inquiry should be done, the number of jury inquiries that may be
conducted in any given trial should be left to discretion of the trial judge and the sound determina-
tion of the courts.
280. Although beyond the scope of this Comment, a mandatory jury inquiry rule might also
extend to civil trials. Even though only the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure contain a jury
polling rule, case law has allowed for the use of jury polls in civil trials. Alusa v. Lehigh Valley
R.R. Co., 26 F.2d 950, 950 (W.D.N.Y 1928) ("the right to poll exists, unless it has been expressly
waived"); see also Castleberry v. NRM Corp., 470 F.2d 1113, 1116-17 (10th Cir. 1972). Thus,
although this Comment argues only that the jury inquiry rule should be added to the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, courts may eventually extend its use to civil cases as well.
281. See supra Part II.B.
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This rule addresses all of the possible concerns raised throughout
this Comment. First, the rule requires a jury inquiry to be conducted
when it "is the result of what the court assumes to be a deadlocked or
hung jury." Thus, the rule is mandatory whenever a judge contemplates
a mistrial on account of a purportedly hung jury. Second, and at the
same time, the rule allows a judge to conduct an inquiry at the request of
a party or at the judge's discretion.28 2 In this way, the inquiry may also
be conducted when a mistrial is not contemplated but where the jury's
status is questioned. Third, the inquiry is to be directed to each juror
"individually" and in "open court." Thus, the rule requires an individual
response from each juror to be officially recorded for use in a possible
future appeal. Fourth, the inquiry asks whether the jurors might reach a
verdict in a reasonable amount of time and, therefore, seeks to avoid po-
tentially exhausting a jury with fruitless deliberations. And finally, the
inquiry explains that the jury is to consider the likelihood of a verdict
with respect to each count. Consequently, the inquiry seeks to prevent
situations, like the Razmilovic trial, in which jurors are unaware of their
option to declare a partial verdict.
V. CONCLUSION: HOW THE NEW RULE WOULD HAVE
CHANGED THE OUTCOME OF RAZMILOVIC
A mandatory jury inquiry rule will have incredible benefits. These
benefits become startlingly obvious when the rule is applied hypotheti-
cally to the Razmilovic trial. First, had the rule been adopted, Judge
Wexler would have been required to conduct a jury inquiry prior to dis-
charging the jury. In so doing, the judge would have determined that the
jury had reached a partial verdict.28 3 The partial verdict would have ac-
knowledged that two defendants, Mr. DeGennaro and Mr. Borghese,
were not guilty of all charges against them. 84 Moreover, of the twenty-
three counts against Mr. Jaeggi, only one would have remained. 28 5 Thus,
an inquiry would have eliminated a number of issues to be decided by a
second tribunal.
Second, Judge Wexler might have determined that the jury could
have reached a verdict on all counts in a reasonable amount of time. If
282. This Comment does not address whether conducting two jury inquiries might be per se
error. See supra note 279.
283. See Borghese Br., supra note 65, at 10; DeGennaro Br., supra note 21, at 18; see also
United States v. Razmilovic, 507 F.3d 130, 139-40 (2d Cir. 2007).
284. See Borghese Br., supra note 65, at 10; DeGennaro Br., supra note 21, at 18.
285. See Borghese Br., supra note 65, at 10.
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so, the Judge might have given an Allen charge or simply sent them back
with additional instructions to continue deliberations.286 In so doing, the
court would have maintained the defendants' valued right to have their
case decided by a particular tribunal. 87
Finally, the jury inquiry would have spared the Second Circuit from
hearing another appeal. Even forgetting the possibility of a partial ver-
dict, had the jurors indicated that they did not believe a verdict could be
reached, each juror's statement would have provided definitive evidence
that Judge Wexler did not abuse his discretion in finding them genuinely
deadlocked and declaring a mistrial.288 Thus, the inquiry could have ef-
fectively rendered the appeal meritless.
Thus, as the Razmilovic case makes clear, a mandatory jury inquiry
rule is fair, efficient, and reliable. It saves potential judicial resources. It
ensures that the jury understands its right to declare a partial verdict. It
elicits answers that can be used on appeal as proof of genuine deadlock.
And, most importantly, it can save defendants from being tried twice for
the same offense.289
286. See Razmilovic, 507 F.3d at 140.
287. See Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 501-02 (1978).
288. See United States v. Horn, 583 F.2d 1124, 1128-29 (10th Cir. 1978).
289. In February 2008, Mr. Jaeggi pleaded guilty to a single felony count. Although at trial he
faced up to thirty years in prison, Mr. Jaeggi's plea agreement resulted in probation with no incarc-
ceration and no fine.
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